consensus that it helps reduce the vulnerability of the poor (Gulyani and Talukdar 2010) , there is disagreement regarding whether it enables them to improve their economic wellbeing (see Develtere (2005) for an overview of this literature).
Thus, given their low economic status most of these migrants are unable to afford to rent housing in the formal housing sector and instead find themselves living in illegal settlements such as slums, shantytowns or squatter colonies. Slums as defined by the UN are settlements which have a combination of insecure tenure, non-durable living structures, insufficient living areas and deficient access to adequate water and/or sanitation (UN-Habitat 2003) .
According to the UN's calculations, in 2003 870 million people lived in slums, and this figure was estimated to increase to 1.43 billion by 2020. And while up until the 1950s it was thought that these settlements were transitory, providing cheap housing to the poor until they improved their economic circumstances, it soon became apparent that for most slum dwellers these settlements were more permanent residences (Beall et al 2010) . This was both due to people being unable to afford the move as well as their unwillingness to do so, where the latter was driven by the convenience of the location and the community network 1 they had established in the slum settlement (Davies 2006) .
The perceived transitory nature of slums resulted in most governments adopting a policy of benign neglect (Beall et al 2010 , Njoh 2003 . This essentially meant ignoring these migrants' illegal land grabbing activities, but at the same time not providing them with any public goods, thereby resulting in these settlements having very unsanitary living conditions. And while the policy outlook on slums has shift significantly, so much so that since 1990s there has been a strong push for slum up-grading -which entails public provision to these communities -inhabitants of these settlements continue to live with grossly under-provided public goods (See for example Beall et al 2010 , Abelson 1996 World Bank 2000) While this of course has general implications for poverty reduction, more seriously, unsanitary communities can pose considerable health risks for its residents. Sacquet (2002) Notwithstanding the health implications for the poor, public goods provision to these settlements may be seen to present policy makers with an interesting conundrum. On the one hand, as mentioned above, these settlements comprise of poor citizens who are particularly disadvantaged by the absence of public goods. On the other hand, most of these residents are illegal squatters and thus providing them with public goods would involve implicitly legitimising their land-grabbing activities. Interestingly, literature on the political economy of slums does not find the illegality of these settlements to be a contributing factor towards their low levels of provision. Instead, as will be argued below, politicians may find the illegality of these settlements fairly advantageous and may exploit it for their own political advantage (Fox 2014 , Baken and Linden 1992 , Davies 2006 . A more convincing argument regarding under-provision therefore lies in the political economy of corruption and clientelism which create perverse incentives when it comes to public investment in slums.
This paper aims to explore this relationship and its impact on public provision. Focusing on urban Pakistan we find that while slums are indeed under-provided with public goods, certain characteristics, both of the slums and households themselves, precipitate this under-provision.
For instance, our results show that slums situated in the periphery of the city are significantly less likely to enjoy public investment. Moreover, within the settlement households that own the land they live on and are aligned with the political party in power are significant more likely to have access to public resources. These are households who have relative high bargaining power and therefore are able to demand some level of public provision from the patronage network. The section that follows gives a theoretical overview of this bargaining game which is played out between slum dwellers and local politicians. The section highlights the main factors influencing relative bargaining powers and ends by laying out two testable hypotheses. Section 2 describes the field study and our empirical strategy. Section 3 highlights our preliminary findings and section 4 concludes the paper.
The Political Economy of Patronage in Slums
The For politicians, on the other hand, the illegal nature of slum residences can provide an opportunity for political contracting and patronage as slum households are likely to require high levels of protection from the law. This protection can be provided by local politicians in exchange for guaranteed votes in the election. Thus an exchange relationship can be established where the slum dwellers offer votes in return for legal protection and access to public resources. The terms of the exchange would depend on the relative bargaining power of each party. While households with relatively strong bargaining power should be able to extract public investment from the exchange, those with a weaker standing may get little other than protection from eviction.
The bargaining power of households is likely to vary based on their level of ownership within the settlement. Households with the weakest bargaining power would be those who lack both property rights and squatter rights 2 . These are households who are most vulnerable to eviction and thus our expectation is that they would only be able to secure protection against eviction in their contract with the politician. Households with the strongest bargaining power, on the other hand, would be those who enjoy property rights. In order to secure their votes, we would expect that politicians offer some level of public provision. In the middle lie households who have squatter rights. They too should be able to bargain for access to some public resources in return for voting for the politician.
However, households' tenure security, and thus the bargaining power it brings with it, is also impacted by the type of slum it resides in. Slum recognition was a policy widely popular in the 1980s, whereby governments would recognize the existence of the slum and grant its inhabitants the right to live there (Beall et al 2010) . Hence, at some point or the other, most developing countries have engaged in slum recognition, resulting in some settlements having tenure security. Therefore, households situated in a recognised community should have stronger bargaining power than those living in unrecognised slums and thus should be able to demand higher levels of public provision.
Lastly, we argue that the location of the slum itself should also matter. Slums in developing countries are found both in the periphery and the centre of the city. While those in the periphery are relatively hidden, those found in the centre are highly visible and tend to be an eye-sore. Those situated in the centre of the city should be more likely to receive public goods when compared to slums in the periphery. Living in the centre makes these settlements extremely visible, thereby having a twofold effect. First of all, the visibility of inner city slums makes it possible for politicians to demonstrate their pro-poor ideology; they can show their responsiveness to the poor by providing for these settlements. Secondly, demand for provision in inner city slums may come from more influential citizens who suffer from negative externalities from these communities 3 . These would be people living around the slum communities who suffer because of their unhygienic conditions. Hence, our expectation would be that those living in unrecognised communities in the periphery are least likely to enjoy public investment while those living in recognised slums in the centre of town are most like to receive public provision.
Based on this we are then able to draw two testable hypotheses.
1. The type of slum a household resides in should have an impact on their chances of receiving public provision. Tenure security in slums recognised by the state should enable residents to demand state investment in their settlements.
a. Furthermore, where the slum is located should also matter. Those in the centre of the city should have a higher chance of receiving public goods when compared to those living in the periphery.
2. Within the slum who receives public goods should vary depending on the level of ownership of the household. Those who enjoy property rights should have higher bargaining power which should allow them to demand higher levels of public provision.
Thus while the first hypothesis would require us to look at slums that vary based on distance from the centre and recognition by the state the second one requires an analysis within the slum to determine who is benefitting from higher levels of provision.
Methodology:
In order to test these two hypotheses we look at public goods provision in slums in Lahore,
Pakistan. The literature on slums and patronage extensively documents the presence of patronage politics in slums communities in Pakistan, thus making it a good case study for this Within the city we look at 12 slums that vary based on two criteria, location and whether the slum is recognized by the government. While half of the slums we visited were situated in the centre of the city, the other half were found in the periphery. Moreover, half of the settlements visited were notified (recognised) in the government records, thereby resulting in the settlement having tenure security. The other 6 were not notified (not recognised). This variation presented us with 4 types of slums; slums in the core of the city that were notified and non-notified and slums in the periphery that were notified and non-notified.
Notified Non-notified This two-by-two variation allows us to analyse the differential effect of distance and slum recognition on the households' chances of receiving public goods. Based on hypothesis 1 we would expect higher levels of provision in slums that are notified when compared to those that are not notified. We would also expect provision levels to be higher in slums situated in the centre of the city. The empirical question then becomes whether non-notified slums in the centre are better off when compared to notified slums in the periphery.
Within the slums the data collection process entailed mapping the slums -which involved identifying the location of every single household within the settlement -and then drawing a random sample of 20% of households. Detailed household level surveys were conducted in the sample households. These surveys asked both closed ended and open ended questions so as to give us a holistic understanding of the political economy of these slums. Figure 1 below illustrates the level of public goods provision 5 in the different types of slums.
Empirical evidence
As can be seen, the highest level of provision is found in the core of the city; at least 40% of households living in the core have access to public goods, and this figure is even higher when we look at notified slums in the core. Interestingly, the difference in provision levels in notified and non-notified slums in the core is not statistically significant. Therefore, when living in the centre of the city, tenure security provided by the state does not seem to matter much for households' chances of receiving public goods. Turning to slums situated in the periphery we find that, not only are provision levels much lower than those in the centre of the city 6 , but also the difference between provision levels in notified and non-notified slums is statistically significant (at the 10% level). Hence this lends evidence to the claim that when the slum is not visible to most city residents, tenure security matters for households to gain access to public resources. Lastly, amongst slums that are notified, we find that those who are also in the core have a better chance of receiving public goods (the difference is significant at the 1% level).
5 The public goods we look at in this study are water, drainage systems and paved streets. 6 The difference is statistically significant. In order to test whether these results hold after controling for household specific characteristics we run the following logistic regression model. In order to determine whether a household is part of a vote bloc we used the same set of questions used by Shami (2012a Shami ( , 2012b . This involved asking the household if they voted collectively. If they responded yes then we went on to ask who the head of the bloc was, why that person was considered the head, why they chose to join the bloc and whether they would face any costs if they didn't listen to the bloc leader.
candidate. Since decisions in these blocs are made collectively, politicians wanting to secure votes need to contract with the leader of the bloc and not individual voters. Interestingly, even though the main function of these vote blocs is to make political decisions, Shami (2012a) documents how they are actually a social network that performs wider social functions.
Depending on relative bargaining powers she finds that these networks can range from being highly exploitative to being a platform through which those within the network can gain access to public goods. Therefore, whether a household receives public goods or not would depend on their relative bargaining power vis-à-vis the leader of the bloc (See Shami 2010 Shami , 2012b for an overview of vote bloc politics) 8 . We stipulate that households who join these blocs in urban slums are those who tend to have weak bargaining power and are in need of protection of some kind and therefore will lack the ability to negotiate public provision on their own. Therefore, in this analysis a vote bloc is considered a negative social network as it reduces the household's chances of receiving public goods. Accordingly, amongst households voting independently, we expect that households which support the party that takes over government should receive higher levels of provision when compared to supporters of the opposition. VG is and VO is test for this with the former being 1 if the household voted for the party that forms the government and the latter being 1 if it voted for the opposition. Lastly, AI is tests whether having access to a local patron increases the households' chances of receiving public goods.
Column 1 in Table 1 starts by running equation 1, which only looks at the effect of belonging to the different types of slums. We find that living in the centre of the city has a statistically significant impact on the households' chances of receiving public goods. Households living in a non-notified slum in the centre of the city appear to have an 11% higher probability of receiving public goods. The full effect of the interaction term is also found to be statistically significant at the 1% level. Those living in notified slum in the centre of the city are found to have a 20% high chance of receiving public goods when compared to households situated in non-notified slums in the periphery of the city (see Model 1 in Table 1 .a.). Lastly, from model 1 in table 1.a. we find that amongst the slums in the core, those living in notified settlements are 10% more likely, significant at the 10% level, to receive public goods when compared to those in non-notified slums.
Columns 2 to 7 add household level controls to see if the effect of location and being notified continues to hold, and who within the slums are benefiting from higher levels of provision.
Columns 2 and 3 start by running a slightly modified version of the equation 2. In Column 2 we only include a control for belonging to a notified slum. As can be seen the variable is not significant 9 . What is found to be significant is households' property rights. In line with hypothesis 2, the table indicates that households which own the land they live on 10% more likely to receive public goods when compared to those that lack ownership. In Column 3 we look at the effect of location, along with other household specific characteristics. Living in the centre is found to be statistically significant, lending support for hypothesis 1.a. that government spending is more focused towards settlements in the centre of the city than those found in the outskirts. Moreover, as before households' ownership has a statistically significant impact on provision levels. Interestingly, households' economic variables are found to have an insignificant impact on its chances of receiving public goods 10 .
Column 4 controls for both location and slum recognition. As in Columns 1 to 3 we can see that location matters for public goods provision. The full effect of the interaction term is statistically significant at the 1% level. Those in notified slums in the centre of town are found to be 22% more likely to enjoy public provision (see Model 2 in Table 1 .a).
Furthermore, after controlling for household specific characteristics we find that amongst settlements situated in the centre of the city, being notified has no significant effect on the households' chances of receiving public goods. Thus it appears that state recognition of the settlement does not matter for provision when the slum is in a visible areaLastly, as before households' ownership continues to have a significant impact on provision levels. Columns 5 to 7 include controls for households' political behaviour. Once again Columns 5 and 6 start by running a slightly modified version of equation 3. Column 5 controls for the slum being notified along with other household level variables. Living in a notified slum is not found to have a significant impact. Household property rights continue to remain significant, even after the inclusion of additional controls. Interestingly, squatter rights, as measured by duration of stay in the settlement, are not found to have a significant impact on households' chances of receiving public goods 11 . Turning to the impact of households' political decisions on provision levels we find that those that vote in a voting bloc are 10% less likely to receive public goods (significant at the 10% level) when compared to households who vote independently. This lends support to the argument that vote blocs comprise of households who are in a weaker bargaining position and therefore are less likely to receive public goods. Furthermore, looking at households that vote independently, those who support the party that came into power are significantly more likely to receive public provision. This result implies that political parties are directly targeting their supporters.
These effects remain significant when we control for location in Column 6 and add the interaction term in Column 7. The full effect of the interaction term too remains significant, at the 1% level, after the inclusion of additional controls. Those living in notified slums in the centre of the city are 21% more likely to receive public goods (see Model 3 in Table 1 .a.).
Lastly, as in Column 4 amongst the slums situated in the centre, being notified does not have a significant impact on the level of public investment in the settlement.
The results presented in this section lend support to hypothesis 1.a. suggesting that visibility matters for public goods provision. At the same time, a comparison of Models 1, 2 and 3
shows that the addition of variables capturing the political leanings of the households and their socio-economic status leads to the effect of notification status becoming statistically insignificant. Thus, it seems that slum notification status may be related to the political and economic standing of the residents of slums, a connection that we aim to explore further in later papers.
Conclusion
Our findings show that the type of slum a household resides in matters for its chances of receiving public goods: those who live in the centre of the city are more likely to receive public provision when compared to households residing in the outskirts of the city. This finding lends support to hypothesis 1a i.e. visibility increases the chances of public investment in slums.
Moreover, the results also provide support for hypothesis 2: despite the addition of multiple controls, households' land ownership continues to have a significant impact on provision levels. Hence the evidence seems consistent with the argument that households which have property rights tend to have higher bargaining power and therefore are able to negotiate for higher levels of provision in exchange for their support of a political candidate.
Lastly, our results also highlight some interesting outcomes with regards to households' political behaviour. Those who vote as part of a vote block, we find, are less likely to receive public provision. As mentioned earlier this could be due to these households having relatively weak bargaining power. Since decisions in these blocs are made collectively politicians wanting to secure votes need to contract with the leader of the bloc and not individual voters.
Therefore, political contracting may involve bloc leaders receiving public resources for their own private benefit, rather than it being spent on individual households. Furthermore, we find that who the household votes for matters for provision outcomes. Households which supported the party in power are found to enjoy higher levels of public investment. Thus it seems politicians are directly rewarding their supporters. These results illustrate that public
